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PROHIBITION OF SURFACE MINING IN WEST
VIRGINIA
PATRICK CHARLES McGINLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Act' pro-
vides the mechanism for prohibiting surface mining of coal 2 in
certain areas of the state where it may cause harm to important
public interests. The following discussion does not purport to be
an analysis of the entire act for that task has already been admir-
ably performed.3 Rather, this article will examine section eleven of
the act which establishes the authority of the West Virginia De-
partment of Natural Resources to prohibit surface mining in cer-
tain situations and grants to citizens the right to oversee, to a
limited degree, the administrative duty created therein.
Attention will also be given to the suggestion that any prohibi-
tion of surface mining pursuant to section eleven of the Act would
be constitutionally infirm absent payment of compensation to
owners of affected coal rights.4
Subsequent to its enactment in 1971 there have been rela-
tively few instances of utilization of section eleven's prohibition
mechanism, and there are no reported cases that have actually
been litigated in and decided by the circuit courts.5 The most likely
* A.B. Dickinson College, J.D. Duke University; Assistant Professor of Law,
West Virginia University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Thomas N. Whittier, J.D. West Virginia University, 1976.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-1 et seq. (1973 Replacement Volume).
2 The Surface Mining and Reclamation Act is not limited to mining of coal but
for the purposes of this article use of the term "surface mining" will refer to surface
mining of coal. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-2(L) (1973 Replacement Volume).
See Cardi, Strip Mining and the 1971 West Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 319 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cardi].
See discussion note 56 infra.
In Anderson and Anderson Contracters, Inc. v. Latimer, Civil No. 11,567
(Cir. Ct. Kanawha Co., filed Sept. 13, 1972) and Ramo Mining Co. v. Latimer, Civil
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explanation for this paucity of litigation is the uncertainty about
the precise scope of the prohibition power and the consequences
which may flow therefrom.' The purpose of this article is to probe
and clarify some of the areas of uncertainty.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: AN ANALYSIS
A. The Administrative Mechanism
Underlying the enactment of the West Virginia Surface Min-
ing Reclamation Act was a finding by the West Virginia Legisla-
ture that, although surface mining is a relatively safe method of
mining which provides needed employment for the state's citizens,
unregulated surface mining also causes conditions which have a
severe and adverse effect on the public interest.7 The Act vests the
state's Department of Natural Resources with jurisdiction over all
aspects of surface mining and gives the Department's Director the
authority to administer and enforce its provisions.8 To assist the
Director in carrying out his duties under the Act, the Legislature
created a Division of Reclamation in the Department.'
No. 11,729 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Co., filed June 5, 1972) coal operators are seeking a
declaratory judgment that several provisions of the Act are unconstitutional. Al-
though these actions were filed in 1972, no decision has yet been rendered.
I See e.g., "THE ENFORCEMENT OF STRIP MINING LAWS IN THREE APPALACHIAN
STATES: KENTUCKY, WEST VIRGINIA, AND PENNSYLVANIA, 55"(Center For Science in
the Public Interest Energy Series VIII, (1975)), [hereinafter referred to as
ENFORCEMENT OF STRIP MINING LAWS].
The Legislature found that surface mining may cause inter alia; soil erosion;
landslides; noxious materials; stream pollution; accumulation of stagnant water;
increases in the likelihood of floods and slides; destruction of land for recreational
and agricultural purposes; destruction of aesthetic values; counteraction of efforts
for the conservation of soil, water and other natural resourses. See W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-6-1, -11 (1973 Replacement Volume). It has been well documented that
the surface mining of coal creates a wide range of effects detrimental to public and
private interests. See, e.g., STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF SURFACE COAL
MINING IN WEST VIRGINIA (1972) [hereinafter cited as SANFORD REPORT]; J. BOCARDY
& W. SPAULDING, JR., EFFECTS OF SURFACE MINING ON FISH AND WILDLIFE IN
APPALACHIA (1968); Reitze, Old King Coal and the Merry Rapists of Appalachia, 22
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 650 (1971); Cardi, Strip Mining and the 1971 West Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 319, 325-38 (1973).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-1 (1973 Replacement Volume). The Act also gives
somewhat similar powers to to the Reclamation Commission and the Division of
Reclamation. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-4, -6 (1973 Replacement Volume). See
Cardi, supra note 3, at 338-346 for a detailed explanation and analysis of the
administrative structure created by the Act.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-3 (1973 Replacement Volume).
[Vol. 78
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The Act also created a Reclamation Commission within the
Department of Natural Resources with the authority inter alia to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of
the statute.'" A five member Reclamation Board of Review was also
created to consider appealed rules, regulations, or orders of the
Reclamation Commission or the Director.'1
B. Statutory Limitations on Surface Mining Operations
1. Director's Duty and Authority to Prohibit Surface Mining in
Certain Areas
Although the Act gives passing recognition to the desirability
of allowing surface mining of coal within the state, the Legislature
placed several limitations on an operator's theretofore almost un-
restricted capacity to conduct surface mining operations anywhere
in the state without regard to their impact on the public interest.
Section eleven of the Act provides:
The legislature finds that there are certain areas in the
State of West Virginia which are impossible to reclaim either
by natural growth or by technological activity and that if sur-
face mining is conducted in these certain areas such operations
may naturally cause stream pollution, landslides, the accumu-
lation of stagnant water, flooding, the destruction of land for
agricultural purposes, the destruction of aesthetic values, the
destruction of recreational areas and the future use of the area
and surrounding areas, thereby destroying or impairing the
health and property rights of others, and in general creating
hazards dangerous to life and property so as to consititute an
imminent and inordinate peril to the welfare of the State, and
that such areas shall not be mined by the surface-mining pro-
cess.
Therefore, authority is hereby vested in the director to de-
lete certain areas from all surface-mining operations.
No application for a permit shall be approved by the direc-
tor if there is found on the basis of the information set forth in
the application or from information available to the director
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-6 (1973 Replacement Volume). The Reclamation
Commission is composed of four members: the Director of Natural Resources, the
Chief of the Division of Reclamation, the Chief of the Water Resources Division and
the Director of the Department of Mines.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-27-28 (1973 Replacement Volume). The act also
provides for an appeal to the circuit court by a party adversely affected by an order
of the Board of Review, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-29 (1973 Replacement Volume).
3
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and made available to the applicant that the requirements of
this article or rules and regulations hereafter adopted will not
be observed or that there is not probable cause to believe that
the proposed method of operation, backfilling, grading or recla-
mation of the affected area can be carried out consistent with
the purpose of this article.
If the director finds that the overburden on any part of the
area of land described in the application for a permit is such
that experience in the State of West Virginia with a similar type
of operation upon land with similar overburden shows that one
or more of the following conditions cannot feasibly be pre-
vented: (1) Substantial deposition of sediment in stream beds,
(2) landslides or (3) acid-water pollution, the director may de-
lete such part of the land described in the application upon
which such overburden exists.
If the director finds that the operation will constitute a
hazard to a dwelling house, public building, school, church,
cemetery, commercial or institutional building, public road,
stream, lake or other public property, then he shall delete such
areas from the permit application before it can be approved.
The director shall not give approval to surface mine any
area which is within one hundred feet of any public road,
stream, lake or other public property, and shall not approve the
application for a permit where the surface-mining operation will
adversely affect a state, national or interstate park unless ade-
quate screening and other measures approved by the commis-
sion are to be utilized and the permit application so provides:
Provided, that the one-hundred-foot restriction aforesaid shall
not include ways used for ingress and egress to and from the
minerals as herein defined and the transportation of the re-
moved minerals, nor shall it apply to the dredging and removal
of minerals from the streams or watercourses of this State.
Whenever the director finds that ongoing surface-mining
operations are causing or are likely to cause any of the condi-
tions set forth in the first paragraph of this section, he may
order immediate cessation of such operations and he shall take
such other action or make such changes in the permit as he may
deem necessary to avoid said described conditions.
The failure of the director to discharge the mandatory duty
imposed on him by this section shall be subject to a writ of
mandamus, in any court of competent jurisdiction by any pri-
vate citizen affected thereby.
12
The precise scope of the duty and authority of the Director
under section eleven is not free from ambiguity and has yet to be
1 w. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
[Vol. 78
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/3
PROHIBITION OF SURFACE MINING
tested in the courts. The Director of the Department of Natural
Resources in fact has apparently chosen to read the provision as
granting him only a narrow authority to prohibit surface mining
in certain locales.'
3
Those who support a narrow interpretation suggest that the
first paragraph of section eleven is merely a general policy state-
ment and that the authority of the Director to "delete certain areas
from all surface-mining operations" extends only to those specific
situations outlined in the five paragraphs which follow immedi-
ately thereafter. This interpretation has, however, been challenged
by at least one commentator who argues persuasively that such a
limited interpretation of section eleven is clearly erroneous." The
logic behind a narrow interpretation is tenuous at best and seems
to fly in the face of the clear legislative intent to protect the envi-
ronment in those areas of the state "which are impossible to re-
claim."" The Legislature found as a fact that in those areas envi-
ronmental harm may result, inter alia, in water pollution, land-
slides, flooding, and the destruction of aesthetic values, recreation
and future uses of surrounding areas. The possibility of the crea-
tion of such harm, said the Legislature, constitutes "an imminent
and inordinate peril to the welfare of the state." Thus, the Legisla-
ture, in the exercise of its power to regulate for the common good,
has found that in some areas of the state surface mining must be
prohibited."6
In ascertaining the scope of his duty and authority under sec-
tion eleven the Director must, therefore, begin with the assump-
tion that there are locations in the State of West Virginia where it
is unacceptable to permit surface mining of coal. The first question
that arises from this premise involves the identification of such
areas. The simple response would be that section eleven indicates
that surface mining must be proscribed in areas incapable of recla-
mation. Such an answer begs the question, for the Act does not set
forth a definition, as such, of "reclamation." It is apparent, how-
ever, in reading section eleven that the words "areas . . . which
are impossible to reclaim" are modified by the list of conditions
which immediately follows that phrase; that is to say, areas impos-
sible to reclaim are those areas where surface mining may cause
' Cardi, supra note 3, at 364, 368.
" Id. at 351.
' W. VA. CODF ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
" Id.
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hazards and harms such as stream pollution, landslides, flooding
and destruction of various desirable land uses.'7
It has been suggested that beyond the point of generally defin-
ing "areas impossible to reclaim" the Act provides the Director
with few guidelines delineating the boundaries of his duty and
authority under section eleven, the premise being that only the
Director can specifically identify those regions. Therefore, it is
asserted that section eleven gives the Director extremely broad
discretion in determining if and when'" it is appropriate for him to
exercise the power of prohibition contained in paragraph two
thereof and that the Director's failure to take prohibitive action is
virtually nonreviewable in the courts. Of such discretion it has
been said: "The [result] is that the particular environmental,
political, social, and economic views of the Director play an over-
whelming role in determining what the law is during any particular
period of time."' 9 If this were indeed the case, section eleven would
be subject to serious constitutional challenge as an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative power, for it is well settled that a legislative
delegation of regulatory power must provide an administrative
agency with a definite standard sufficient to guide the agency in
the exercise of its discretionary enforcement powers."0
It can hardly be conceded, however, that this is the only possi-
ble interpretation of the Director's powers under section eleven. On
the contrary, it would seem that, when viewed as a whole, the Act's
delegation of power to the Director, although inartfully worded,
grants him discretion which is so limited that it would assuredly
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The standards set forth in section eleven, (may cause water
pollution, landslides, etc.) provide a sufficient guide for agency
action.2' It is not really the absence of adequate legislative stan-
'* See text accompanying notes 34 to 44 infra.
* It has been suggested that section eleven does not give the Director power
to designate regional areas of prohibition prior to application for permits to surface
mine within those areas. See discussion in Cardi, supra note 3, at 364-365.
" Cardi, supra note 3, at 369.
See, e.g., State ex rel. County Ct. v. Demus, 148 W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352
(1964); State v. Bunner, 126 W. Va. 280, 27 S.E.2d 823 (1943); Chapman v. Hun-
tington Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, 3 S.E.2d 502 (1939).
1' For examples of statutes representing the exercise of the state's police power
to prohibit an activity for which there is more than normal justification for allow-
ance, because of only possibility of harm, see W. VA. CoD ANN. § 16.9-4 (1972
Replacement Vol.) (prohibition of sale or gift of cigarette, cigarette paper, pipe or
[Vol. 78
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dards that gives rise to the suggestion that the Director's action
may be based on such subjective and improper grounds as his
personal social views, partisan political considerations, or theory
of environmental priorities. Rather, it is the placement of power
to implement paragraph one of section eleven in the hands of one
person-the Director-that gives rise to the suggestion of
impropriety. While it is, indeed, possible that the Director may
abuse his discretion, such action would not result from inadequate
legislative standards in section eleven. On the contrary, there is no
guarantee that any public official will faithfully execute even the
clearest of duties imposed upon him by the Legislature.
There may be nothing inately offensive or unlawful about giv-
ing the Director sole power to decide when and where to prohibit
surface mining under the Act. One must wonder, however, if grant-
ing such power to the Director was the intention of the Legislature.
If the administrative structure created by the Act is viewed as a
whole, a different conclusion is suggested.
2. Duty and Authority of Reclamation Commission Under
Section Eleven
One must not lose sight of the fact that the West Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act rests on one major premise-
that surface mining is desirable only in those areas where "proper
reclamation" can be expected to negate the possibility of harm to
the public interest." The Act sets forth a procedure by which this
tobacco to person under 18 years of age); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-19-1 (1974 Replace-
ment Vol.) (prohibition of signs, advertisements, etc. in or upon right of way of
highway); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-22-3 (1974 Replacement Vol.) (prohibiting out-
door advertising and signs within 660 feet of right of way); and W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-23-4 (1974 Replacement Vol.) (prohibiting licensing of salvage yards within
1000 feet of edge of right of way of state road). There are some who suggest that
some activities subject to serious penal sanction, such as use of marijuana, raises
little possibility of harm to anyone, but such arguments have met little acceptance
in the courts. Breecher, Marijuana: The Health Question/Legal Question, 4
CONTEMP. DRUG 115 (1975); Gerber, Cannabis: A Critical Review, 13 W. ONT. L.
REv. 79 (1974); Note, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 648 (1975). The above are only token
examples of such legislation directed toward protecting the public from the possibil-
ity of harm.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-1 (1973 Replacement Volume), provides in perti-
nent part:
The legislature finds that, although surface mining provides much
needed employment and has produced good safety records, unregulated
7
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goal may realistically be attained. That procedure includes the
creation of a Reclamation Commission in the Department of Natu-
ral Resources. The Reclamation Commission is given the authority
to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to implement the
Act. To assist it in devising such rules and regulations the Com-
mission has the power to hold public hearings and to subpoena
documents and witnesses, as well as the power to appoint advisory
committees to aid in the development of programs and policies."'
Following passage of the Act in 1971, the Reclamation Com-
mission, not the Director, promulgated rules and regulations pur-
suant to its mandate to do so "for the effective administration of
the act."24 The promulgation of such rules and regulations is neces-
sary not so much to limit the agency's discretion but to formalize
it so as to give notice concerning respective rights and duties to all
who might be affected by the Act and to provide rules by which
the Department may gauge its own conduct to insure fairness for
all concerned. The absence of rules and regulations clearly setting
forth departmental policy is likely to make efficient administration
of the statute difficult and subject the Department to frequent
litigation by those who claim discriminatory or otherwise unfair
enforcement of the Act.
Having created the Reclamation Commission with such broad
rule making powers, it is logical to assume that the Legislature
intended the Commission to use such powers to develop detailed
criteria for identifying those areas of the state where surface min-
surface mining causes soil erosion, pyritic shales and materials, land-
slides, noxious materials, stream pollution and accumulation of stagnant
water, increases the likelihood of floods and slides, destroys the value of
some lands for agricultural purposes and some lands for recreational pur-
poses, destroys aesthetic values, counteracts efforts for the conservation
of soil, water and other natural resources, and destroys or impairs the
health, safety, welfare and property rights of the citizens of West Vir-
ginia, where proper reclamation is not practiced.
The legislature also finds that there are wide variations regarding
location and terrain conditions surrounding and arising out of the surface
mining of minerals, primarily in topographical and geological conditions,
and by reason thereof, it is necessary to provide the most effective, benefi-
cial and equitable solution to the problems involved.
See also paragraph one of W. VA. CoDa ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
See, e.g. State ex rel. W. Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W. Va. 636,
171 S.E.2d 545 (1969); Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 95 S.E.2d 832 (1956);
Wiseman v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445 (1950).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-6 (1973 Replacement Volume). See note 10 supra.
24 Cardi, supra note 3, at 341-42.
[Vol. 78
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ing creates a possibility of danger to the public interest and thus
must be barred.? It is most plausible that the Legislature, having
in section eleven generally described those conditions indicative of
reclamation impossibility, left it to the Commission's expertise
and not the Director's to decide the exact parameters of the areas
where surface mining must be prohibited. Consistent with this
interpretation, the Director's authority is literally what section
eleven says: "to delete certain areas from all surface-mining
operations" 2 -the administrative tasks of enforcing the standards
set forth in section eleven and in the Commission's rules and regu-
lations.
Such an interpretation of the Act answers the argument that,
by giving the Director, alone, power to "delete," the statute con-
tradicts the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act.2 The
Administrative Procedures Act provides that every "regulation,
standard, or statement of policy or interpretation of general appli-
cation and future effect . . . affecting private rights" is a rule.2
Such interpretation also recognizes the clear intent of the Legisla-
ture that the Commission 2 not the Director, shall promulgate rules
in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act's require-
ments of public notice and opportunity for the public to be heard."
Moreover, any rule or regulation of the Commission may be ap-
pealed to the Reclamation Board of Review and thence to the
courts.3 '
The preceding interpretation of the extent of the Director's
discretion in light of the legislative purpose underlying the Act not
only saves it from any possible constitutional infirmity but is the
most rational reading of the statute.
2 It would also follow that the Commission could, by rule, prohibit surface
mining from identified areas which fit the prescribed criteria. Such action would,
of course, be taken prior to specific permit applications. It would have the great
benefit of giving fair notice to those interested in exploiting the designated area's
coal reserves that coal could not be extracted therefrom. Any rule or regulation
setting forth regional surface mining prohibition would be subject to review at the
instance of persons adversely affected. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-28 (1973 Replace-
ment Volume).
26 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
" Cardi, supra note 3, at 365.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(c) (1971 Replacement Volume).
21 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-6(a) (1973 Replacement Volume).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-1 to -7 (1971 Replacement Volume).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-38, -29 (1973 Replacement Volume).
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3. The Statutorily Imposed Standard for Determining When
Prohibition is Required
It is most important to note that, subsequent to the passage
of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, the Legislature en-
acted a surface mining moratorium law which prohibited surface
mining in the counties of the state where it had not previously been
undertaken.3 2 Thus, the Legislature has mandated the wholesale
prohibition of surface mining in twenty-two counties encompas-
sing a large percentage of the total land area of West Virginia.
If the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act is read in light of
the subsequent passage of the moratorium law, the legislative in-
tent to place severe restrictions on surface mining activity within
the State becomes manifest. The Legislature has concluded that
in twenty-two counties surface mining is per se inimical to the
public interest.
The limitation of the surface mining moratorium to twenty-
two counties was probably the result of a legislative recognition of
political reality; a statewide prohibition of surface mining would,
on balance, have too harsh an impact on those communities where
such operations had become a significant factor in the local econ-
omy. However, from the Legislature's decision to enact such a
large scale monatorium, and from the Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Act's complementary recognition of the myriad injuries
surface mining may cause,33 one is led unavoidably to the conclu-
sion that the state's solons looked with great skepticism on the
probability that surface mining can be conducted without serious
harm to the public interest. Therefore, it would be reasonable to
assume that through paragraph one of section eleven the Legisla-
ture intended the Department of Natural Resources to carefully
circumscribe the extent to which surface mining may be conducted
in the state.
With this in mind it can be reasonably argued that paragraph
one of section eleven requires that surface mining be prohibited,
not in cases where it will necessarily cause harm, but rather in the
much broader range of situations where harm to the public interest
may result. Paragraph one states in pertinent part:
[T]here are certain areas . . . which are impossible to reclaim
[and] . . . if surface mining is conducted in these certain areas
.'12 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6A-1 (1973 Replacement Volume).
33 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
[Vol. 78
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such operations may naturally cause . . . hazards, and so...
such areas shall not be mined by the surface-mining process.3
[emphasis added]
Although one might contend that the words "impossible to
reclaim" is the standard for determining when surface mining
must be prohibited, a close reading of section eleven strongly sug-
gests a different interpretation. The section indicates in unequivo-
cal language that surface mining in areas that are impossible to
reclaim "may" (rather than "will") cause hazards. It follows that
some areas that are impossible to reclaim may not cause hazards.
Thus section eleven does not distinguish between those areas
where the effects of impossibility of reclamation are certain and
those areas where such effects are speculative. If there exists a
possibility that a hazard or harm to the public interest may result
from surface mining then the area "shall not be mined by the
surface mining process." It can be argued with much cogency that
section eleven is an example of lawmakers' unwillingness to gam-
ble with public interests. Such a decision would seem well within
the province of the Legislature. There is no rule of law which re-
stricts legislative power to situations where it is certain that a
dangerous instrumentality will bring about the harm of which it
is capable.
On the contrary the source of many legislative proscriptions
is legislative recognition that a particular activity is potentially
dangerous or harmful to the public.3 5 In a somewhat analogous
situation in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay C.
& D. Commission,"6 the California legislature enacted a statute
which permitted a state agency to prohibit the placing of fill in San
Francisco Bay because "the haphazard manner in which the bay
is being filled threatens the bay itself and is therefore inimical to
the welfare of both present and future residents of the bay area
... ."3 The California court of appeals upheld the statute as a
valid exercise of the states police power notwithstanding the fact
that prohibition of fill was allowed in the absence of a showing that
the fill activity would itself cause harm to the bay.3
31 Id.
3 See note 21 supra.
3 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. First Dist., Div. Three 1970).
3T 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (Ct. App. First Dist., Div.
Three 1970).
31 11 Cal. App. 3d at 572-73, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
11
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In such instances it is the potential for harm to the public
rather than certainty of result that provides the impetus for exer-
cise of legislative power. It cannot seriously be contended that such
legislative determinations are invalid. The Legislature's decision
not to take chances where the possibility of harm from surface
mining exists is merely another instance of legitimate exercise of
the police power.
In essence, then, paragraph one constitutes a legislative find-
ing of fact that in certain areas surface mining may cause hazards.
The use of the words "may cause" and "hazard" indicate that the
less rigorous standard of possibility rather than probability of
harm is the test that must be applied by the Reclamation Commis-
sion in determining the areas where surface mining should be cur-
tailed. Where the possibility of such hazards exist the Legislature
has concluded that the welfare of the State is adversely affected
and surface mining must be prohibited.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that the Legislature has
not indicated that "environmental" harm is the only factor to be
weighed by the Reclamation Commission and Director in deter-
mining the presence of a hazard to the public interest. Section
eleven also injects into the equation a consideration of the poten-
tial adverse economic impact surface mining may have on the
economy of a given area; consequently section eleven requires the
Commission to consider whether surface mining may destroy aes-
thetic values, recreational areas and future desirable land uses."5
Such considerations represent what must certainly be a legislative
awareness of the great long range economic benefits tourism and
recreation can bring to a state which officially advertises itself as
"wild and wonderful," 0 as well as awareness of the commonly held
belief that the presence of surface mining in an area creates an
inhospitable climate for a tourist-recreation industry.'
As a practical matter, application of the "possibility of harm"
test required by paragraph one of section eleven may require the
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume).
" The state of West Virginia publishes a periodical entitled WEST VmINIA
MAGAZINE one purpose of which is to promote tourism. "Wild, Wonderful, West
Virginia" is a slogan often utilized therein to facilitate this purpose. The state's
motor vehicle registration plates also are inscribed with this motto.
" Whether surface mining always has an adverse effect on the environment is
fairly debatable. There are many who argue with much force that an area properly
reclaimed may be more valuable and may be put to greater and more beneficial
use after surface mining and reclamation than before.
[Vol. 78
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Reclamation Commission to canvass the various regions of the
state in order to determine where surface mining can be conducted
without significantly harming either the local environment or
economy. This is so because it appears that the thrust of paragraph
one of section eleven reflects an intention to protect interests
broader than merely those of landowners whose properties are situ-
ated adjacent to a proposed surface mine tract.4 2
Regional consideration by the Commission prior to specific
application for permission to mine would create a uniform ap-
proach to determination of the potential impact of surface mining
in the area. The likelihood that all relevant factors would be con-
sidered would increase with utilization of such review.43 This proce-
dure certainly would tend to vindicate the broad public interest
which section eleven seeks to protect. Moreover, it would be only
fair that the owners of coal rights be put on notice as soon as
possible of the State's intention to inhibit the value of such prop-
erty interest."
An example of a situation where surface mining most certainly
should be barred under the section eleven "possibility of harm"
test would be an area which possesses scenic characteristics and
11 In section eleven the Legislature mentions possibility of harm caused by
stream pollution; destruction of aesthetic values; and destruction of recreational
areas and the future use of the area and surrounding areas. The use of such terms
arguably suggests a broad regional concern about the potential impact of surface
mining activities. For a discussion of the pro and con of "area-wide deletion" see
Cardi, supra note 3, at 364-366.
'1 Even if the Commission adopted regulations indicating regional surface min-
ing prohibitions based on a state-wide study, the Director would retain the power
to deny permit applications if the circumstances of a given case required such
action. Denial would be appropriate where the Director finds that the proposed
operation will not meet the requirements of reclamation regulations promulgated
by the Commission.
Thus, even if some relevant facts relating to surface mining impact were not
brought to the attention of the Commission they might still be revealed in the
course of departmental review of specific applications. This double check procedure
enhances and is consistent with the legislative intent to limit surface mining in
those areas where there is a possibility of harm to the public interest.
" The promulgation of regional prohibition regulations would be subject to
review. Such an appeal can be made at any time after promulgation thereof. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-28 (1973 Replacement Volume). Also, if the Director denied
a permit on the basis of regional prohibition regulations the applicant would have
the right to appeal within thirty days thereof. Id. If, however, a challenge to the
regulations failed in the first instance it is likely that an aggrieved permit applicant
would be collaterally estopped from re-litigating the same issues upon denial of a
permit.
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an environmental ambiance which is presently or has the future
potential to attract tourists in numbers which may significantly
benefit the local economy. A remote sparsely populated mountain
region where indigenous large and small game hunting and/or trout
fishing are available for recreational exploitation would fit such a
description. So too, would an area where recreational activities
such as boating, golfing, fishing or skiing have attracted or give
promise of attracting vacation enthusiasts with their attendant
potential for pumping dollars into the local economy. In each in-
stance surface mining should be prohibited in the area.
In light of the above it is difficult to comprehend how section
eleven can reasonably be interpreted to require anything but a
painstakingly comprehensive ongoing environmental and eco-
nomic impact study of all regions of the state by the Department
of Natural Resources and the reduction of the findings therefrom
to detailed regulations prescribing criteria upon which to base sec-
tion eleven prohibitions of surface mining in certain areas.
One might argue that such a study, (based, as it must be, on
the premise that surface mining should be prohibited where there
is a possibility of harm to the public interest) would result in quite
severe limitations upon surface mining activity within the state.
This suggestion may, indeed, be accurate. However, keeping in
mind the clear language of paragraph one and the legislative mora-
torium on surface mining in twenty-two counties, such a conclu-
sion would seem to be not only reasonable but inescapable.
C. Mandamus As A Remedy Under Section Eleven
One should not assume from the above discussion that un-
bounded discretion is placed in the hands of the Commission and
that there is no possiblity to review departmental action which
permits surface mining in an area where prohibition seems to be
required by the section eleven mandate. There is a means provided
by the act to challenge such administrative action. It is found in
paragraph eight of section eleven:
The failure of the director to discharge the mandatory duty
imposed on him by this section shall be subject to a writ of
mandamus, in any court of competent jurisdiction by any pri-
vate citizen affected thereby.45
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1973 Replacement Volume),
[Vol. 78
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The language "any private citizen affected thereby," would
seem to be a broad grant of standing to sue to any citizen who is
affected in any way by the director's failure to act. 6 Thus the
director's grant of a permit may be challenged by a private citizen
who, although not a party to the permit process, is in some way
affected. Such a grant of standing does little more than allow a
potential litigant to pass through the courthouse door. The ques-
tion remains: what is the scope of the mandamus remedy so benefi-
cently granted to West Virginia citizens? Traditional concepts of
mandamus require that the writ will issue only if three factors
coexist:
(1) A clear legal right to the relief sought;
(2) the absence of another adequate remedy at law; and
(3) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondents to do the
thing which the petitioner seeks to compel . 7
The private litigant seeking to challenge the grant of a surface
mining permit can satisfy the first two elements of the test. Part
one is essentially, in the context of section eleven, a standing re-
quirement which is satisfied if the petitioner can show that he is
affected by the director's action. That is to say, section eleven
probably permits any angler who fishes in a stream adjacent to a
proposed surface mining area to sue in mandamus. 8
The litigant can also easily satisfy the second part of the test,
for there would seem to be no other remedy available at law to
redress the type of indirect injury to private citizens for which
section eleven grants standing. Obviously a tort suit for completely
speculative monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy
11 One must assume that the Legislature intended a more relaxed stanaard
than the more usual "person aggrieved" requirement. As a matter of fact in section
twenty-eight of the Act the Legislature more narrowly limits the grant of standing
to appeal rules, regulations or orders of the Reclamation Commission to persons
"claiming to be aggrieved or adversely affected." The implication is that the Legis-
lature recognized the significant although indirect interest all citizens have in the
preservation of environmental amenities. It is perhaps also a recognition that pri-
vate citizen oversight of administrative action will cause the agency to show
optimum sensitivity to factors involving possibility of harm to the public interest.
See generally, K. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.01 et seq. (1958) for a
general discussion of standing to challenge administrative action. See also, Cardi,
supra note 3, at 362, n. 167.
,7 See, e.g., Traverse Corp. v. Latimer, 205 S.E.2d 133, 138, (W. Va. 1974);
State ex rel Booth v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs, 196 S.E.2d 299 (W. Va. 1973).
," See Cardi, supra note 3, at 362.
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for taking from the fisher a stream's ability to sustain fish and
aquatic life.
It is part three, the "clear legal duty" requirement of the
mandamus test, that creates considerable difficulty for the poten-
tial litigant. Judicial concern with "clear legal duty" in the context
of mandamus evinces the courts sensitivity to the fundamental
concept of separations of powers.49 The West Virginia Constitution
prohibits one branch of government from exercising power belong-
ing to one of the others."
Courts have been especially cautious of separation of power
implications in cases where they are urged to delve into facts or
perform functions which seem to be outside their realm of
competence or authority.5 ' From this kernel has grown the limited
scope of review doctrine in administrative law; courts must give
deference to an agency action and will not substitute their opinions
for the agency's in the absence of fraud, manifest abuse of discre-
tion, or error of law.2
Keeping in mind the separation of powers restraints imposed
upon the judiciary, the question for consideration would seem to
be: In what circumstances does section eleven create a clear legal
duty in the Director to deny a surface mining permit? Having
superficially studied the text of section eleven, one might reason-
ably argue that it creates no such clear legal duty in the director.
For example, the possiblity that stream pollution may occur would
appear to be the type of technical determination which is pecu-
liarly in the province of agency expertise. For a court to substitute
its notions of when stream pollution may occur for the judgment
of the Department would seem to be precisely the type of situation
which the traditional mandamus test seeks to avoid.
" Davis, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia, 60 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957). See also Harrison, The West Virginia Administrative
Procedure Act, 66 W. VA. L. REV. 159 (1964).
' W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1. It has been said that "departments of the govern-
ment must be kept separate and distinct, and each in its legitimate sphere must
be protected." Miller v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362, 379 (1884). See also, State ex
rel. State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946). Hodges v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834 (1931).
5, Davis, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia, 60 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1957).
" See generally, K. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 28.01-30.14
(1958).
[Vol. 78
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It would appear then, that section eleven's mandamus remedy
is illusory. Such an interpretation, however, leads to the very un-
palatible conclusion that the creation of such an illusionary rem-
edy was nothing more than a crass political maneuver on the part
of the Legislature to deceive the public into thinking that surface
mining would be permitted in West Virginia only when it would
not significantly damage public interests. This interpretation is
both unacceptable and unnecessary. While section eleven will not
receive awards for expert draftsmanship, its emphasis is clear.
Strip mining should be excluded from areas where it may cause
harm to the local environment or economy. As discussed above, in
order to comply with section eleven's mandate, it is incumbent
upon the Reclamation Commission to perform a comprehensive
environmental and economic impact study and set forth by regula-
tion criteria for identifying those areas where strip mining must be
prohibited. In light of this it is submitted that it is the clear duty
of the director under section eleven to deny surface mining permits
where the possiblity of harm to the public, as defined by the law
and regulations, exists.53 While section eleven mandamus may not
be used as a vehicle to seek judicial second guessing of the direc-
tor's decisions, it should be available to challenge the grant of a
strip mining permit when the area in the vicinity of the property
sought to be mined has not been subjected to the rigorous scrutiny
of a comprehensive impact study such as that required by section
eleven. A prima facie case of violation of the Director's section
eleven duty would be made out if he issues a permit even though
the reclamation commission had not undertaken such an impact
study or issued regulations based thereon.
Thus the mandamus remedy, to which the Director is subject,
requires a judicial determination of whether the Department has
created procedures by which the public interest may be adequately
protected from surface mining hazards. Certainly it is within the
competence of the judiciary to determine whether the Department
has formulated a detailed strategy for implementing the legislative
mandate that surface mining be barred where it presents the possi-
bility of harm to the public interest. If the Commission has failed
to adopt comprehensive regulations seeking such an end, the
13 It should be noted that the singular "duty" rather than "duties" is used in
section eleven to define the situation where mandamus will lie against the Director.
The implication is that all of the requirements of section eleven are to be considered
part and parcel of one larger "duty."
17
McGinley: Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Director in granting a permit cannot be said to have given due
consideration to the possiblity of harm to the public interest. It is
clearly the Director's duty to deny a surface mining permit where
such consideration is absent, and thus mandamus should lie to
compel the Director to comply with this duty.
If the Commission has adopted "prohibition" or "deletion"
regulations to guide the Director, mandamus should issue where
the Director's grant of a permit was inconsistent with such regula-
tions."
It is also possible, although the burden of proof would be
greater, that a successful mandamus action may be instituted to
compel the director to revoke a permit even though the director has
adhered to the regulations. As mentioned above, such a case would
arguably call for the exercise of some discretion on the part of the
Director in determining when, for example, stream pollution might
result from surface mining. If, however, the Director had decided
that there was little chance of stream pollution, his grant of a
permit should still be subject to mandamus when it can be shown
by a petitioner through clear and convincing evidence that pollu-
tion might occur. It could logically be argued that such an action
would not run afoul of the "clear legal duty" concept. While the
director's determination of the possibility of water pollution calls
for a decision based on administrative expertise and is, to a point,
discretionary, the failure to deny a permit where substantial evi-
dence exists to show pollution may occur would amount to an
arbitrary act and constitute an abuse of discretion.
Other than mandamus under section eleven, there is no avail-
able vehicle by which citizens generally may seek review of this
type of arbitrary agency action. It is reasonable to assume that, in
keeping with the tendency of West Virginia courts to advance and
enlarge its scope, the Legislature intended the writ to be used in
just this type of situation to combat agency abuses of discretion.
This is not to say that proof of arbitrary action or abuse of discre-
tion is simple and that there is a great likelihood that a petitioner
would prevail; however it is suggested that it was the intention of
the Legislature that citizens should at least have a right to be
heard in such situations. This is not a novel idea. On the contrary,
the interpretation afforded the section eleven mandamus provision
herein is in keeping with traditional mandamus concepts which
1' See text at note 26 supra.
[Vol. 78
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allow the writ to issue when administrative action is arbitrary,
capricious or based on a misapprehension of law.
55
D. Summary of the Statutory Procedures
In sum, the West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Act provides that there are areas in the state where no surface
mining should be permitted because of the possibility that harm
to the public interest may result. The Department of Natural Re-
sources Reclamation Commission is given the authority to specifi-
cally delineate by rule those areas where conditions outlined by the
Legislature may result from surface mining. The Director is re-
quired to delete such areas from all surface mining operations. The
failure of the Commission to promulgate regulations setting forth
detailed criteria upon which to base a decision to delete, or the
Director's failure to deny a surface mining permit in areas where
the legislatively enumerated conditions may result is subject to
mandamus attack by any citizen affected thereby.
As thus constituted, this statutory scheme indicates a lauda-
tory effort on behalf of the West Virginia Legislature to insert
considerations of the public interest into the administrative deci-
sion making process. With its provision for public hearings, grant
to the public of standing to review both the Commission's regula-
tions and the Director's decisions to sue, 6 and the Act's extensive
protection of procedural and substantive rights of coal operators,
it strikes a rational and necessary balance between very important
competing interests.
HI. SURFACE MINING PROHIBITIONS: COMPENSABLE TAKINGS
OR NON-COMPENSABLE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER?
A. An Overview
The constitutionality of section eleven of the West Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act has been challenged because
it does not provide that compensation be given to those persons
" In West Virginia "the tendency ... is to enlarge and advance the scope of
the remedy of mandamus, rather than to restrict and limit it .... State ex rel.
Smoleski v. County Ct., 153 W. Va. 307, 312, 168 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1969). See e.g.
Thacker v. Crow, 141 W. Va. 361, 90 S.E.2d 199 (1955); Carter v. City of Bluefield,
132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); State ex rel. Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin,
92 W. Va. 618, 115 S.E. 583 (1923); Cross v. West Virginia Central & Pa. Rwy. Co.,
35 W. Va. 174, 12 S.E. 1071 (1891).
5' See, e.g. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-26 to -29 (1973 Replacement Volume).
19
McGinley: Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
whose ownership of coal rights "may be adversely affected by sur-
face mining limitations. 5 This issue arises out of the fifth amend-
ment provision stating, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation,"58 and from the West Vir-
ginia Constitution which adopts the fifth amendment language
broadened by the use of the words "property damaged or taken.""
The following discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive
treatment of the myriad conflicting "taking" theories and auth-
ority. Rather, the consideration given to the issue is founded upon
the notion that while there may be many situations where the
existence of a compensable taking is fairly debatable, the state's
regulation of surface mining in the context of the West Virginia
Act is not compensable even if it clearly rises to the level of a
prohibition.
The requirement of compensation has not been interpreted
literally by the courts, but instead has been viewed as a mandate
for the courts to impose fairness in property conflicts between com-
peting public and private interests; protecting individual property
interests from arbitrary or capricious exercise of governmental
51 A declaratory judgment action is presently pending in the circuit court of
Kanawha County, West Virginia, which raises a broad challenge to the validity of
the Act as a whole and on the enforcement aspects of section eleven in particular.
Anderson and Anderson Contractors, Inc. v. Latimer, Civil No. 11,567 and No.
11,729 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Co., Filed Sept. 13, 1972). Apparently the current direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources feels that the constitutionality of sec-
tion eleven is questionable and has given such rationale for his failure to exercise
the full authority granted him by section eleven. See, ENFORCEMENT OF STRIP MIN-
ING LAWS, supra note 6, at 55. The propriety of the Director's action in failing to
enforce a statute because its constitutionality has been challenged is questionable,
but will not be addressed in this article.
"' U.S. CONST., amend. V. This prohibition has been held applicable to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266, 279 (1943).
' W. VA. CONsT. art. 3 § 9. See Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 445, 190
S.E. 680, 683 (1937). Twenty-two other states have adopted this broadened lan-
guage, while twenty-five states retain the exact language of the fifth amendment.
In New Hampshire and North Carolina which have no such constitutional provi-
sions, the courts have found takings only when property has been appropriated. See
2 NICHoLs, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.38 (3rd ed. 1969). See also Com-
ment, 47 MINN. L. REV. 889, 890 (1963); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950). See generally, State ex rel.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 154 W. Va. 306, 175 S.E.2d 428 (1970); State ex rel
Lynch v. State Rd. Comm'n, 151 W. Va. 858, 157 S.E.2d 329 (1967).
[Vol. 78
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power as well as guarding the general public welfare from private
encroachment."
Courts and commentators have long labored to devise a frame-
work of analysis through which such conflicts might be fairly re-
solved but have been singularly unsuccessful. One commentator
who has struggled to make some sense out of the various themes
and reasoning which runs through "taking" cases has found that
"the predominant characteristic of this area of law is a welter of
confusing and apparently incompatible results."'" Numerous theo-
ries have been advanced by distinguished scholars promoting var-
ious approaches which they suggest will bring some clarity and
rationality to analysis of taking issues.2 It seems, however, that
each and every theory thus advanced is subject to major criticism
because, while it may prove useful in resolving some taking con-
flicts, it is of limited utility in dealing with others. 3
11 For a recent example of this approach see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962) in which the "taking" issue seems to turn on the "reasonableness" of
government action.
62 Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Sax].
62 See F. BOSSELMN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (Council on
Environmental Quality 1973); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972);
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: 30 Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV.
681 (1973); Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning and Withheld Municipal
Services: Takings of Property by Multi-government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 635
(1973); Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1972); Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as
Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967); Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v.
Eminent Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1968); Plater, The Takings Issue in
a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201 (1974); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Comment, Eminent Domain-
Conservation, 6 NAURAL RESOURCES J. 8 (1966); Comment, The Taking Issue: Paten-
tiable Obstacle to National Resource Management Legislation, 54 ORE. L. REV. 64
(1974); Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293
(1969); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338
(1972).
613 For a general criticism of the major taking theories see Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974). Perhaps the real
problem with the various taking theories is their proponent's failure to grasp the
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The most recent statement of the Supreme Court of the
United States on the subject of taking came in Goldblatt v.
Hempstead." In Goldblatt a municipal ordinance directed toward
sand and gravel mining prohibited excavations below the water
table and imposed an affirmative duty on mine operators to refill
any excavations that had already reached below that level. As a
practical matter the ordinance promised to have the affect of se-
verely curtailing or eliminating Goldblatt's sand and gravel opera-
tion. Goldblatt appealed alleging, inter alia, the ordinance was not
a business regulation but rather was completely prohibitory and
confiscated his property without just compensation."5
In upholding the Town of Hempstead's ordinance the Court
suggested general guidelines for determining whether particular
governmental activity constitutes a compensable taking. The
Court noted that "every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibi-
tion" and that if the ordinance constituted a valid exercise of the
town's police powers, the fact that it deprived the property of its
most beneficial use did not render it unconstitutional." The Court
emphasized, however, that governmental regulation may become
"so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally re-
quires compensation.""7 Notwithstanding various attempts to cre-
ate one, the Court recognized that "there is no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins."6
The Court indicated that while a comparison of values before
and after imposition of government regulation is relevant, it is not
conclusive.69 In fact in one case, the Court noted, a diminution of
lesson implicit from their failure-because of the myriad factual possibilities atten-
dent taking problems, no one mode of analysis will fit all situations.
" 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
In Goldblatt it was argued that the ordinance completely destroyed the
economic value of the land. Brief for Appellant at 18.
" 369 U.S. at 592. In support of this proposition the Court cited Walls v.
Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hadacheck v. Sebastian 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); and Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887). The Court also noted that it was not of controlling significance that
the "use" prohibited was of the soil itself as opposed to a "use" upon the soil, or
that the use was arguably not a common law nuisance. 369 U.S. at 593.
" 369 U.S. at 594 citing Pennsylvania's Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
369 U.S. at 594. See also, United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156
(1952).
" 369 U.S. at 594. The "diminutions of value" theory is often applied in taking
cases. Diminution of value has been considered most recently in cases involving
wetlands statutes, flood plain regulation, gravel mining, and in other contexts.
[Vol. 78
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value from $800,000 to $60,000 was upheld. 0 Because of the inade-
quacy of the record as to diminution of value in Goldblatt, the
Court did not find it necessary to draw a line indicating where
regulation ends and taking begins. Instead the Court indulged in
"the usual presumption of constitutionality" and upheld the ordi-
nance as a valid exercise of the town's police power.' Although
police power regulations must be reasonably necessary to accom-
plish their purpose, the Court emphasized that the burden is on
the challenger to show unreasonableness.7 1 Moreover, if this bur-
den was not heavy enough, the Court suggested that if the reason-
ableness of a particular enactment were debatable courts should
defer to the legislature.
73
While the inadequacy of the record in Goldblatt allowed the
Court to finesse the taking question, the case does seem to provide
some guide for deciding whether given government activity consti-
tutes a compensable taking. This guide will perhaps not suit the
fancy of legal academicians who seek to develop "the test" to be
applied across the board to every situation where taking may be
an issue. 74 Such criticism notwithstanding, Goldblatt does provide
a rational framework for the often complex considerations of taking
issues. While the commentators seek the consistency which flows
from fixed formulae, they seem to ignore the possibility that flexi-
bility may be the essence of fairness in the context of taking. Con-
siderations of competing interests in the public and private sector
"' Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See also Turnpike Realty Co.
v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1108 (1973); Queenside Realty Co. v. Saxl 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For an extensive collection of similar cases see, 1 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.23 (1968). See also Krasnowiecki & Strong,
Compensable Regulations for Open Space, 29 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 87 (1963).
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S., 590, 594 (1962).
72 Id. at 596, citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959)
(exercise of police power presumed constitutionally valid); Salsburg v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954) (the presumption of reasonableness is with the state);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (exercise of police
power will be upheld if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably
be assumed affords support for it).
See Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932).
T Professor Sax concluded that Goldblatt and other recent cases leave "the
impression that the Court has settled upon no satisfactory rationale for the cases
and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often con-
flicting theories without developing any clear approach to the constitutional prob-
lem." Sax, supra note 61 at 46.
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may in fact require case by case analysis, for the weight given such
interests and the resultant protection afforded them may be sub-
ject to frequent reevaluation. What is considered a useful activity
yesterday may be deemed of marginal utility today and an immi-
nent peril tommorrow.
Thus the manufacture of liquor in Kansas was completely
prohibited in 1887,11 but not today; lotteries once looked upon with
much disfavor now flourish under state sponsorship;" and a brick-
yard which is an acceptable industrial enterprise may be greatly
restricted when a residential community grows up around it."
The lesson of Goldblatt then, may be implicit in the Court's
reminder that there is no "set formula" for determining when com-
pensation is required. Rather the Court pragmatically suggests
that at least two considerations are relevant. If there is no diminu-
tion of value of the property then there is, of course, no compens-
able taking. If there is some diminution of value a court must then
look to the rationale underlying the legislative enactment to ascer-
tain whether it is so onerous as to require compensation. If the
regulation involved is determined to be a valid exercise of the
state's police power Goldblatt would arguably stand for the propo-
sition that great deferrence should be granted to the legislative
scheme and it should be upheld if consistent with fundamental
notions of fairness. Certainly one would have difficulty arguing
that a fair regulatory scheme could nevertheless be termed "oner-
ous." Such a view is consistent with the historical antecedents of
the fifth amendment. Professor Sax argues that:
"[I]t can be demonstrated that the English and American au-
thorities writing at about the time of the adoption of the fifth
amendment also viewed the provision as a bulwark against un-
fairness, rather than against mere value diminution." 8
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
7' Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
" Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
7" Sax, supra note 61 at 57. Professor Sax relates:
What seemed to concern the early writers was not the fact of loss but
the imposition of loss by unjust means. It was the exercise of arbitrary or
tyrannical powers that were sought to be controlled.
We have become so indoctrinated with the idea that quantitative
value maintenance is a constitutional principle and dictate of "natural
equity" that we have conveniently forgotten the extensive non-property
background in our law. [Tihe Christian [as opposed to the Roman]
tradition ... devised the legal concept of "just price" . . . a fundamen-
[Vol. 78
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The West Virginia courts have long espoused the general ap-
proach to taking set forth in Goldblatt. In 1915, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that governmental interference
with beneficial use and ownership of land may constitute a taking
if it does not fall within the ambit of general police power of the
State. 9 If, however, the regulation does constitute a valid exercise
of the police power then West Virginia courts are unlikely to re-
quire compensation. The Supreme Court of Appeals-accepts the
premise mentioned above that the concept of police power regula-
tion must be flexible to meet changing situations and developing
data:
The police power is difficult to define because it is so extensive,
elastic and constantly expanding . ..to meet the new and
increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society
.... It embraces the power of the state to preserve and pro-
mote the public welfare and it is concerned with whatever af-
fects the peace security, morals, and general welfare of the
community. . . .The exercise of the police power cannot be
circumscribed within narrow limits nor can it be confined to
precedents resting on conditions of the past. As civilization be-
comes more complex and advances are made, the police power
of necessity must develop and extend to meet such conditions."0
B. A Section Eleven Prohibition is not a Compensable Taking
While it is true that in some contexts there may be an almost
imperceivable line distingushing a taking from a non-compensable
exercise of the police power, it is equally true that in some situa-
tions the facts allow for no doubt as to where such a line must be
drawn. Thus no authority need be cited for the proposition that a
landowner must be paid if the state condemns his land for highway
tal premise of medieval economic life ... founded upon the notion that
property and economic position must be subordinated to the attainment
of social justice.
Id. at 57, 55.
11 Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915) (building line
regulation ruled improper exercise of power which does not extend to aesthetic
grounds). See also, Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949)
(denial of commerical use variance in area zoned residential, but actually
essentially commercial, ruled a taking.)
10 Farley v. Graney, State Rd. Comm'r, 146 W. Va. 22, 35-36, 119 S.E.2d 833,
842 (1960). See also State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740,
143 S.E.2d 351 (1965); Nulter v. State Rd. Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549
(1937).
25
McGinley: Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
construction; nor is there any doubt that compensation would not
be required if the state were to order cessation of blasting which is
a necessary element of a stone quarry operation located in close
proximity to a children's hospital."'
In either instance it would make no difference whether the
property value was diminished-to take property for highway con-
struction purposes without paying compensation would be onerous
without regard to the extent public welfare would be promoted; the
effective prohibition of stone quarrying because of its disturbance
of hospital functions on the other hand would not be compensable
no matter how great the monetary loss suffered by its owner. In
each situation the key to achieving the "correct" result would seem
to involve the element of fairness. Applying the test of fairness to
a section eleven surface mining prohibition one must necessarily
conclude that compensation would not be required.
To constitute a valid exercise of the states' police power it
must be shown that it bears some reasonable relation to the public
health, safety morals or general welfare of the area affected."2 The
legislative purpose of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act is
clear-to limit the potentially severe adverse effect of surface min-
ing upon a broad spectrum of public and private interests. 3 The
prohibition of surface mining in areas where it may cause harm to
the public certainly bears a reasonable relationship to public
health, safety, and the general welfare. 4
Even if the regulatory scope of the Surface Mining and Re-
clamation Act bears a reasonable relationship to its purpose,
Goldblatt suggests that it may still be unreasonable as applied
N' Such a situation would be somewhat analogous to the provisions in section
eleven which bar surface mining within one hundred feet of public property or
which will consitute a hazard to a school, church or institutional building etc.
Query, whether there is any real difference between these prohibitions and a prohi-
bition of surface mining for the reasons stated in paragraph one of section eleven
(stream pollution, flooding, damage to land uses, etc.).
"' See e.g. Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) for a statement of the test of
reasonableness of state police power regulations still relied upon today. Cf. Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hemstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962)
- See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-1, 11 (1973 Replacement Volume). See note
7 supra.
81 See note 39 supra.
[Vol. 78
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because of its onerous effect on established property interests-
thus requiring compensation."
It is necessary then, to determine, if possible, the parameters
of the impact of a section eleven prohibition and the effect it would
have on the owner of vested rights in coal.
One might inquire initially as to the value of such a property
interest prior to invocation of a section eleven prohibition. One
indication of the value of coai rights is the tax assessment or valua-
tion of the property. As a practical matter, a survey of most rural
counties would probably reveal that coal is valued at less than ten
dollars per acre and divided coal rights or surface coal rights are
valued much lower if at all. 6 While practically speaking such val-
uation may not always reflect the market value of the property, it
is supposed to." In any case such valuations are accepted and
adhered to by owners of coal rights, and thus they should not be
heard to challenge the fairness of using such valuations for "tak-
ing" analysis purposes.8
If the hypothesis is correct, that tax assessments or valuation
of coal rights is relatively low, this fact would indicate that both
in fact and in the view of the Legislature, ownership of coal is
nothing more than ownership of an expectation interest. The value
of such an interest is marginal until it is determined that the
quality, mineability and marketability of the coal are such that
mining the coal is profitable. It should also be emphasized that the
owner of coal rights must certainly be aware of the increasing
severity of governmental regulation of surface mining activity to
protect the environment. The low valuation of coal rights must
certainly also reflect a recognition that governmental regulation
may greatly limit the extent to which potential profits from mining
of coal will in fact be realized. 9 If it is concluded that mining will
- 369 U.S. 590, 593-94 (1962); See e.g. HFH, LTD v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.
3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974) to the effect that in certain cases even a valid
exercise of the police power can involve a taking.
11 Another relevant indicator of value would be what the property owner paid
for the coal.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3-1 (1974 Replacement Volume) provides that real
property be assessed at its "true and actual value." But see SANFORD REPORT, supra
note 7.
" It would be unusual indeed to find the owner of coal rights who would protest
a valuation of his interest as being too low.
" See Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n., 2 Pa. Cmwlth 441, 279 A.2d
388 (1971). In Bortz the court found that there existed no feasible way to abate air
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be profitable, the value of the coal would yet be minimal until
substantial investments are made to realize that potential." Thus
in situations where surface mining has not actually been initiated,
the only effect of a prohibition would be upon expected or potential
profits.
Having arrived at perhaps the only logical, non-speculative
means of valuing coal rights, one must then determine the effect
of a section eleven prohibition thereon. In a situation where a
person owns all of the coal under a tract, owns the surface and all
or part of the coal, or owns the coal and surface "in fee" the owner
may use his property in various productive ways. He may use it to
deep mine coal, or to grow and harvest timber. He may use it for
agricultural, recreational, residential, or industrial development.
With any of these uses his property interest would not be valueless
and may not be diminished at all.
Where a person does not own "deep" coal or the surface, but
possesses only an interest in "surface" mineable coal, he would
still own the coal notwithstanding invocation of a section eleven
prohibition. Moreover, technological advancements may eventu-
ally allow him to mine the coal either by deep mining methods or
new surface mining techniques which will not cause the various
harms to the public interest section eleven was designed to pre-
vent. Thus, the owner of such coal rights retains the expectancy
he possessed before prohibition-based largely on his gamble on
the potential value of the coal if and when development could take
place."
pollution from the company's coke ovens and thus shutdown of the operation ap-
peared to be required. The court held this not to be a compensable taking because
"[piroperty is held under the implied obligation that the owner shall use it in such
a way as not to be injurious to the community." Id. at 451, 279 A.2d at 394.
"1 This discussion underlines the fact that once mining has started there is a
greater chance of onerous diminution of value than before development and sug-
gests the importance of action on the part of regulatory agencies before mining
activity actually begins.
11 See e.g. Sibson v. State, 111 N.H. 304, 282 A.2d 664 (1971) (prohibition of
filling of wetlands sustained); the fact that a property owner had fully recovered
his investment on the sale of a portion of his property was considered sufficient to
preclude compensation with regard to effect of prohibition on his remaining prop-
erty. See also, Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767.768
(1972). In Just the court distinguished "natural and non-natural uses." Said the
Court:
The Justs argue their property has been severely depreciated in
value. But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land
[Vol. 78
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In light of the relatively low valuation of coal rights and the
largely speculative nature of a coal owner's expectancy of profit,
it would seem fair to conclude that the extent of diminution of
value of such rights resulting from a section eleven prohibition
would be minimal. Even if diminution of value were substantial
the coal owner could be said merely to have gambled and lost.
When one has undertaken to speculate on development of interests
in estates in land, can he argue that he is constitutionally entitled
to protection from loss?
The question remains, is a section eleven prohibition so oner-
ous a regulation as to constitute a taking which constitutionally
requires compensation? Keeping in mind Goldblatt's deference to
legislative determinations explicit and implicit in police power reg-
ulations and its co-extensive requirement of fairness, the answer
would clearly be negative. The owner of coal rights possesses a
property interest the value of which is speculative in nature and
which he knows or should know is subject to governmental regula-
tion including prohibition. Thus, when the government acts to
protect multifaceted and broad based public and private interests
by prohibiting surface mining of his coal, no onerous burden is
placed unfairly on such owner. As the Supreme Court of the United
States recently emphasized:
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clear air make the area a sanctuary for people.2
in its natural state but on what the land would be worth if it could be
filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While loss of value is to be
considered in determining whether a restriction is constructive taking,
value based upon changing the character of the land at the expense of
harm to public rights is not an essential factor or controlling.
56 Wis. 2d at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771. See also, Comment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1582
(1973). Cf. Bureau of Mines v. Georges Creek Coal Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748
(1974) in which the court in reviewing a case involving the prohibition of surface
mining in a state park suggested that, in weighing the factors involved in determin-
ing whether there had been a taking, the value of the property as a whole (not just
of the minerals) should be considered even if ownership of land estates had been
severed.
92 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). See also Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.
Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937); G-M Realty Co. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360,
120 S.E. 2d 249 (1961).
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IV. SUMMARY
The West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, al-
though poorly drafted, does in fact provide a useful tool to be used
by the Department of Natural Resources in protecting vital public
interests. The Act is clearly constitutional notwithstanding
pending "taking" challenges. The failure to strictly administer and
enforce section eleven limitations subverts the legislative purpose
underlying the act and endangers precious resources belonging to
all of the people, resources which once lost may never be reclaimed.
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